American policy by Slaughter, John Willis, 1878-
VI 
AMERICAN POLICY 
AS there been supplied from the United States any H great formative force in the development of Latin 
America? T h e  answer is undoubtedly affirmative, but our 
influence has been exerted largely without contact, and for  
the most par t  unconsciously, like a fact of geography. 
There  is a degree of similarity in our own relationship to 
the sea power of Great Britain. Very few Americans un- 
derstand how much of our freedom for  development was 
conferred by the British navy, and how impossible would 
have been our policy of isolation without British friend- 
ship. In the same fashion, but more definitely, we gave 
protection to Latin America during a period when it 
must have been overwhelmed by the aggressively expand- 
ing nations of Europe. 
T h e  na- 
tion which supplied a political model and accorded protec- 
tion also fought the Mexican W a r .  Hence protection 
against outside nations, but not against ourselves, has been 
the universal acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine among 
Latin Americans ; and i f  their countries must become 
colonies, they are unable to prefer us to  Europe. T h e  
menace of American aggression-the “phantasm” of the 
Mexicans-has supplied the atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust in which professions of friendship are even less con- 
vincing than the pretenses of European diplomacy. Is 
there ground for this fear?  Our history shows that we 
But American influence has had another side. 
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have never hesitated to act as we chose toward such Latin 
American states as have come in our way, and we possess 
all the power necessary. Fo r  some, therefore, it appeared 
that the Monroe Doctrine merely barred the door of the 
ogre’s house to  prevent interference with the meal. T h a t  
personage may affirm friendship, and even weep, but may 
eat all the same! 
Thk above is a fair description of Latin American feel- 
ing. Is it justified? Of course it is-partially. I t  fails to 
understand how much of our tradition and political con- 
ception forbids brutal conquest, but it realizes that we are 
a missionary nation capable of using bayonets to enforce 
the right, and that we might decide what is right without 
careful consideration. Intervention is somehow implicit 
in the Monroe Doctrine. These matters remained in the 
background for  three quarters of a century; they are now 
acutely foremost. Things cannot continue as before, be- 
cause separation has been bridged by a multitude of con- 
tacts. W e ,  just as little as our neighbors, can afford to  
be at  the mercy of a program of vague and dangerous 
possibilities, called out by the moment’s feeling. W e  need 
to know what we are going to  d o ;  moreover, we need to 
know it a t  this precise stage in the rearrangement of in- 
ternational relations. 
In  all probability the course of action pursued in the 
immediate future will fix our relationships with the Latin 
American republics for  several decades to  come. To set 
this course wisely is the more difficult because there has 
been, since the beginning of our Caiibbean action, a series 
of confused gropings rather than a comprehensive, defini- 
tive, and far-reaching policy. In  other words, we have not 
yet decided upon objectives nor have we thought about 
means. Unless clarity and continuity can now dominate 
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our action, we may be led into blunders that  will entail the 
most serious consequences. Such a policy must lead rather 
than follow the demands of public opinion. T h e  mass of 
Americans can be counted upon to  back the fair and decent 
action, especially if it is conducive to the best interests of 
all concerned. But public opinion can be stampeded in al- 
most any direction selected by propagandists. Plans and 
actions are responsible to  their ultimate results rather than 
to  any momentary demand. In the past the tendency has 
been to play upon a single note with little regard to  the 
whole composition. Conditions of recognition, intervention 
to  protect American lives, the Platt Amendment, and most 
interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine are partial, sub- 
sidiary, and unorganized elements of policy. Nor  can ex- 
pediency be a safe guide. W e  can only with difficulty take 
a separate line of action with the different republics, 
especially of the northern group, fo r  there is a reactive 
solidarity in all Latin America that cannot be disregarded. 
What  we do in Mexico is eagerly watched in all other re- 
publics, because of the belief that  this action will finally be 
extended to them. When our marines are landed in any 
small Caribbean state, there should be some intention gov- 
erning this action, and some foresight of final results. 
A definite policy in the future must be rooted in the 
relationships of the past. For  several decades the theory 
and the practice of the Monroe Doctrine coincided, and 
this was because the theory of our relationship to the Latin 
American states was supported by conditions in the devel- 
opment of this country which kept us from any line of con- 
tinuous external action. T h e  time was certain to arrive 
when it would be necessary to  define in detail this blanket 
doctrine, and a t  this point it was equally certain that the 
realities underlying the theory would emerge and determine 
54 Social Forces in the Growth of Latin America 
action. Until twenty years ago, therefore, our isolation 
and economic self-sufficiency, combined with the fact of 
racial and cultural difference, preserved within the Monroe 
Doctrine the fiction that these were completely independent 
states which we were merely protecting against European 
aggression. But the real conception of the relationship 
that is common to  all Americans, and on which all would 
be prepared to  take action, is that here is a family of re- 
publics of which we are  the first and most authoritative 
member. W e  are  not unconscious that in providing im- 
munity from European aggression we are assuming re- 
sponsibility, but not until recently did any cause arise to 
stimulate this responsibility into action. But the back- 
ground of feeling must not be underestimated. W e  would 
consider it an outrage if  a European country should in- 
tervene in a Latin American republic, but we should con- 
sider ourselves completely justified in undertaking such in- 
tervention if  we conceived it to be necessary. Again, we 
are  prepared to encroach upon its sovereign action i f  any 
one of these states should attempt a foreign alliance 
prejudicial to our national interests. 
An important distinction must be drawn between the 
more advanced South American states and those that re- 
main backward. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile developed 
statehood, though still somewhat unstable, under the old 
Monroe Doctrine. Relations with these republics must 
therefore go into a special category. It may be that i f  
time had been allowed, all of the other states could have 
grown into political security in the same manner, but cir- 
cumstances have changed in a way to make this impossible, 
With reference to these larger states it must, however, 
be borne in mind that complete independence is not pos- 
sible. Wi th  Argentina, for  example, ever since the semi- 
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constitutional working of her government has justified im- 
munity from political interference, there has remained, 
without greatly diminishing, an economic dependence upon 
Europe. And this could conceivedly act reflexly upon 
political arrangements. Circumstances might arise which 
could result in hostility to the United States in that par t  
of America. I t  may be asked, what difference can this 
make to us? T h e  answer is that we cannot be indifferent 
to the attitude of any one of those countries, because they 
are solidly connected with other sections of Latin America, 
with which we have vital concern. Furthermore, despite 
the emphasis laid by writers upon differences of race, 
language, and tradition, and upon present commercial af- 
filiations, there is an element of unity which overshadows 
all these differences. Those countries are par t  of a cer- 
tain geographical area which will be still more closely 
associated with us, with the further development of trade 
and transportation. Again, there is an important identity 
of tradition. T h e  inhabitants of those republics are con- 
scious of their membership in a system which severed its 
connection with Europe, and proceeded to the conquest of 
a new continent, which is therefore Iiberty-loving and 
forward-looking. It is easy for  individuals to establish 
European relationships, but the people as a whole and in 
their organized capacity look to the United States politi- 
cally, socially, and economically as their model and example. 
This  circumstance provides a broad and completely 
sound basis on which a close and mutually advantageous 
connection can be built. A diplomatic representative of 
high standing, with a mastery of the Spanish language, and 
playing a par t  socially and intellectually similar t o  that of 
our representative in London, could in a period of a few 
years establish bonds between the two countries that  
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would be proof against any foreign action. This  is assum- 
ing that commercial intercourse will develop a t  the same 
time. T o  put it bluntly, there is every reason for  the 
United States to hold a position of influence based on 
mutual interests and free from all distrust. T h e  same piece 
of work would be more difficult in Chile and much easier 
in Brazil. 
But with other states, those bordering on the gulf and 
the Caribbean, the problem is different and other methods 
are required. T h e  reasons of course lie in our history,-in 
the necessity for protecting the mouth of the Mississippi, 
the possession of the Canal, and our naval occupation of 
Caribbean waters. Added to these is our predominant 
commercial interest, which of itself was certain in the long 
run to  bring about a re-definition of policy. With these 
states, with the exception of Mexico, we are in fact exer- 
cising a protectorate in the ordinary sense of the term. 
W e  are, without protest from other nations, interfering to 
maintain order and to  prevent war. Our  marines are or- 
dered ashore with audacious promptitude and with little 
objection from any important body of public opinion in 
this country. 
I t  is most important to  put fact and fiction in their 
proper place in our future policy. Otherwise measures that 
seem at the moment justified and expedient may prove se- 
rious blunders. First of all, it is a fiction that any of the 
states of Central America and in the Caribbean, and, pres- 
ently, the northern tier on the South American continent, 
are free and independent states whose mode of conducting 
their domestic affairs is indifferent to  the people and gov- 
ernment of the United States. If this is true, it is a mis- 
take of policy to  give them normally the scope and power 
of independent states and intermittently attempt to deter- 
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mine their action. This  method inevitably leads to bully- 
ing and to all the harsh feeling that comes when we seem- 
ingly meddle with other people’s business. T h e  important 
thing is to make the meddling so continuous and so bene- 
ficial that it will gain the acceptance of a fixed institution. 
Can this be done in a way consistent with respect for  
sovereignty? 
If the present methods, unorganized by policy, are  pur- 
sued much longer, we shall probably find ourselves facing 
the necessity in some of these states of administering their 
affairs. This  would be unfortunate. While there is no dis- 
counting the administrative work done by Americans under 
temporary occupations, especially that accomplished in 
Cuba, a t  the same time we are  not fitted to  undertake in 
a large way the administration of dependencies. American 
political theory is inimical to it, and we are deficient in 
trained personnel. T h a t  temporary occupation and ad- 
ministration of government provide a n  apprenticeship in 
self-government, is an illusion. It has not so issued in 
Cuba, and it is to be hoped that this government will not 
commit the stupid blunder of conferring self-government on 
the Philippines. N o t  until we are free from school-boy 
notions about the magical absorption of our political con- 
ceptions by backward races, can we enter the field of ad- 
ministration of dependencies. 
W h a t  then can be done? Any one well acquainted with 
hlexico or  Cuba must be aware of the position of extra- 
ordinary power and influence held by the diplomatic rep- 
resentative of the United States. There  were critical points 
in Mexican affairs when an American ambassador might 
have dominated the whole situation and have done much to 
avert the troubles of the past ten years. This  would have 
required a man with a grasp of the great factors, and 
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without prejudices that would prevent his playing an eff ec- 
tive part. T h e  recent difficulties in Cuba had their dress 
rehearsal in  1916, when the Constitution was set aside and 
the existing administration used its power to defeat the 
elections and continue itself in office. T h a t  was the mo- 
ment for  our State Department, even though we were on 
the verge of war with Germany, to  step in and fulfil the 
whole purpose of America in Cuba,-that of insuring the 
working of constitutional government. Those who were 
to blame for  Cuba’s political troubles are  not all Cubans. 
While there have been some notable exceptions among 
American representatives in Latin American countries, the 
general rule has shown a most unfortunate selection. In  
any of these capitals lies one of the heaviest tasks in the 
whole range of diplomatic activity. W e  are concerned 
with real and long-continuing relationships. Men are too 
frequently selected for  these posts to  satisfy claims for 
political service, and the Latin American posts occupy the 
lower end of the honor roll. 
T h e  first condition, then, of carrying out a long-distance 
policy with this group of states is to select men of the 
highest attainments and of proved administrative skill. 
Although acting as diplomatic agent, the real function of 
such a representative will be that of adviser to the govern- 
ment. This  would leave the conduct of affairs to the 
native administration, but would bring American influence 
to bear forcefully and skilfully and continuously upon that 
conduct of affairs. A clear policy established by the State 
Department would guide the representative’s actions. H e  
would necessarily have a close acquaintance with the his- 
tory and people of the country. But this would not be 
sufficient. H e  would require a staff of expert assistants 
who would make it their business to keep him fully in- 
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formed as to  social, economic, and political conditions. 
Certain general rules or fixed elements of policy would 
guide all representatives. These would contemplate re- 
moval of the present political maladjustments. First of 
all, American influence should be continuously used to  en- 
force respect for  the Constitution. T h e  rules of the game 
are  repeatedly set aside in these countries which are  f a r  
from being deficient in political and legal knowledge and 
skill. T h e  umpire of the game, the Supreme Court, has 
no final authority o r  power to  enforce decisions. Our  gov- 
ernment has already established a precedent in the Platt  
Amendment. This  principle could be extended to  the other 
states and give this country enormous power toward estab- 
lishing stable government. Again, our representatives, 
working with this conception of  policy, should labor to  
strip the presidency in each of these states of its dictatorial 
power. This  cannot exist with true observance of the Con- 
stitution. Once the legislature and the Supreme Court  are  
established in their true positions, and fiscal control is 
taken out of the President’s hands, his arbitrary power 
comes to an end. W e  should understand once for all that  
we cannot end revolutions by merely forbidding them. 
Revolutions are  incidental to a system which constitutes a 
vicious circle. This  can be stopped not by intermittent out- 
side action on our part ,  but by continuous internal action. 
Behind all of these modes of influence must stand the in- 
dubitable authority and strength of the United States. 
But  even the landing of marines should have its place in 
policy and be the instrument of civil purpose. I t  does more 
harm than good to hand control over t o  a military officer 
whose methods and objects can hardly be identical with 
those of the enlightened permanent representative of our 
government. There  is another matter of the first im- 
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portance,-our policy in Latin American countries must be 
disentangled from the pressure of economic interests. It 
is disgraceful that in the past, diplomatic representations 
have so often supervened upon the clamor of groups of 
persons with property interests in Latin American coun- 
tries. This  is not asserting that it is not the duty of our 
government to  protect the lives and property of our citizens, 
but this protection must go 011 all the time and not await 
the moment when, to  all appearances, action has been pre- 
cipitated by propaganda. T h e  loss of life is, of course, 
intentionally played up by those who are  interested in pro- 
tecting and extending the scope of their economic benefits. 
T h e  foreign offices throughout Latin America know pre- 
cisely what is being done. They  are well acquainted with 
the press-agent methods of securing action by the State 
Department. T h e  consequence is a universal belief that 
we are  using our national strength for  the purpose of se- 
curing more favorable treatment of our investors. This  is 
of course only partially true. T h e  important point is that 
it gives a rating to  our policy. T h e  organized interests 
should be given to  understand that their methods of rais- 
ing an outcry can only hinder the department in doing its 
duty. T h e  matter can be carried still further. I t  
is a mistake to  use diplomatic pressure in the support 
of interests which in those countries are universally ad- 
judged unfair. I n  all right economic enterprises in a for- 
eign country, there is something of mutual benefit. I t  is 
difficult to  imagine Great Britain having constantly to  put 
diplomatic strength behind the multitude of British inter- 
ests in Argentina. Stated bluntly, we are  not called upon 
to  forward the projects of our citizens in foreign countries 
“to hog it.” It insures 
fair and equal treatment. It endeavors to maintain stable 
Real protection is of another kind. 
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political conditions, and insists that  change of conditions 
shall not work injury to our investors, in exactly the same 
manner as our laws at  home protect against damage. 
T h e  only special case among the northern group of 
Latin American republics is that  of Mexico. T h e  distinction 
is one due to size and consequent importance. I n  one 
sense this case determines our policy with reference to  the 
other states. W e  could, af ter  some practice, administer 
directly the affairs of the smaller countries. This  is im- 
possible with Mexico. Any belief we may have that oc- 
cupation would bring order out of chaos for more than the 
time being is the greatest of delusions. T h e  difficulties are 
beyond the conception of any one who knows Mexico only 
from the outside. It is to  the interest of all concerned that 
Mexicans should carry on their own government. I t  is 
our concern that this government should be stable, that its 
operations should meet average standards of political 
morality, and that we should be able to do business with 
Mexicans under fair  and safe conditions. But we cannot 
make the Mexican government stable by demanding that it 
be so; we cannot sweep aside the political habits and meth- 
ods of thinking of four centuries by writing truculent notes 
o r  issuing strong opinions formed by ignorant and 
prejudiced commissions. In other words, we must under- 
stand that we possess no magical method bringing about 
orderly conditions. This  can be done only by painstaking 
and constant work on the spot. If possible, we should 
free the Mexican mind from the “phantasm”-the belief 
that  we mean to  take possession of their country-and sub- 
stitute for it a confidence in our wish and ability to help 
them solve their problem. With  the perpetual threat of in- 
tervention we are playing out our trump-card without 
result. Whenever a show of force is made, it should be 
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without proclamation. No conviction is carried through 
mere advertising. And as  intervention is a last resource 
and a type of adventure upon which we naturally hesitate 
to  embark, we should place it completely in the background 
and develop other methods of diplomatic pressure. It is 
a mistake not to have in Mexico City during a disturbed 
period the most skilful representative we can place there,- 
even if  formality forbids our accrediting an ambassador to  
a government that we do not recognize. In  other words, 
our course should be shaped by the realities and not by the 
fiction. As to  recognition, we only destroy our influence by 
drawing up a petty list of conditions. W h a t  we demand 
of the Mexican government is that  it be stable, responsible, 
and fair in its treatment of foreigners. These are condi- 
tions of fact and not of promises. W e  form our judgment 
as t o  whether a government deserves our recognition. W e  
do not permit that government to  negotiate for  recognition. 
All the foregoing concerning Mexico is based upon the 
assumption, which is adequately grounded in all the circum- 
stances, that Mexico, like the other Latin American states 
of the northern group, stands in a special relationship to  
the United States. Th i s  relationship flows from our over- 
whelmingly predominant interest, strategic and economic. 
It is a relationship which limits Mexico’s freedom of as- 
sociation with the other states. I t  is one which contem- 
plates the inevitable high degree of economic unity of the 
two countries. In  other words, Mexico is in fact a pro- 
tected state with whose domestic affairs we must of neces- 
sity concern ourselves. 
It would be of the greatest advantage i f  Congress could 
understand the importance of providing adequate repre- 
sentation in the Latin American countries. W e  cannot d o  
the work which the Monroe Doctrine now demands from 
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us with the low grade of ability a t  present used, with the 
short, overworked, unskilful staffs on which ministers must 
depend, and with the poverty-stricken, undignified housing 
of our representatives. T h e  carrying out of this policy 
successfully will cost money, but it will be repaid a thou- 
sandfold in the benefits of closer association and the saving 
of loss through disturbed conditions. And it is true that 
disturbed conditions will continue in some of these republics 
for decades, unless we take firm hold in the near future. 
JOHN W. SLAUGHTER. 

